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Pecuniary Interest of Justices of
the Peace in Kentucky;
The Aftermath of Tumey v. Ohio
By

R

ENETH VANLANDINGHMAM*

ENE,,ED INTEREST in Kentucky justice of the peace courts was

created when the Kentucky Court of Appeals in its 1956 opinion
in Roberts v. Noel' reached the conclusion that the United States
Supreme Court in its 1927 decision in Tumey v. Ohio2 intended
to, and did, outlaw all judicial systems in which the trial judge is
compensated solely by fees paid by convicted persons. This decision has direct application to Kentucky justices of the peace
who are compensated in this manner.' The Court will not issue a
mandate to enforce its ruling until the expiration of the terms of
incumbent justices; however, it has ordered that, before such officials may proceed to try cases, they must inform defendants of
their right to demand trial before an impartial court. On a national level, too, the decision has signal importance in that it is
the first decision of a state court of last resort, at least so far as
* A.B., M.A., University of Kentucky; Ph.D., University of Illinois. Assoc.
Prof. of Political Science, University of Kentucky.
1296 S.W. 2d 745 (Ky. 1956).
2 273 U.S. 510, 47 S. Ct. 437 (1927).
3 Since the Roberts case was decided, some county judges in the more populous
counties have appointed judges called trial commissioners to conduct misdemeanor
cases in the county court. These officers are lawyers and are compensated by
salary. They are required to make reports of proceedings in their courts to the
county judge. The Court of Appeals gave apparent sanction to the office of trial
commissioner in its recent decision in Brown v. Hoblitzell,-S.W. 2d-(Ky. 1956).
Some such arrangement as the trial commissioner system does seem necessary,
because the Constitution (sec. 135) forbids creation of courts save those established by it. Trial commissioners, appointed by and responsible to the county
judge, seem questionable, however, in view of the fact that the Constitution
authorizes the election of only one judge for each county. See Judge Sims' dissenting opinion in Brown v. Hoblitzell, supra. See also Meyers v. Walter, 253 S.W.
2d 595 (Ky. 1952). County judges in the more populous counties ought to be
given specific constitutional authority to appoint judges to hear both misdemeanor
and civil cases in the county court. Such judges should be required to be lawyers
and should be compensated by salary.
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the author is aware, voiding entirely the criminal jurisdiction of
justice courts. It seems proper, therefore, to re-examine the Supreme Court's decision in the Tumey case, together with subsequent interpretations of the decision by the Kentucky Court of
Appeals and other state supreme courts.
The Tumey Decision
Those who question the constitutionality of misdemeanor
cases conducted in justice courts presided over by justices having
a pecuniary interest in their result generally rely upon the United
States Supreme Court's decision in Tumey v. Ohio. What this
case holds is not exactly clear; the Supreme Court itself has never
given adequate explanation of it; and a reading of various state
supreme court opinions interpreting it reveals considerable disagreement concerning its actual meaning.
In the case itself, one Tumey was tried and convicted, on a
charge of possessing intoxicating liquor, in a mayor's court in
North College Hill, Ohio, after his protest that he could not receive a fair trial because of the mayor's financial interest in his
conviction. He was tried before the mayor without a jury, without opportunity for retrial, and with review of his case confined
to questions of law. In the event of acquittal, the mayor received
no compensation. In this particular case, his fees and costs
amounted to $12. The village of North College Hill, of which the
mayor was chief executive officer, was also in need of revenues,
and half of the fines imposed by the mayor's court went to the
village treasury. The operation of the mayor's "liquor court,"
which had county-wide jurisdiction, was evidently intended to
provide increased village revenue. For the purpose of enforcing
the prohibition law-and also increasing village revenue-the city
council was empowered to use any part of the fines going to the
city treasury to hire attorneys, detectives, or secret service officers.
In its opinion, the Supreme Court noted that, under the common law, the slightest pecuniary interest of any officer, judicial
or quasi-judicial, in resolving the subject matter which he was to
decide rendered the decision voidable. Finally, it stated, "From
this review, we conclude that a system by which an inferior judge
is paid for his services only when he convicts the defendant has
not become so embedded by custom in the general practice either
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at common law or in this country that it can be regarded as due
process of law, unless the costs usually imposed are so small that
they may be properly ignored as within the maxim de minimis
non curat lex." The Court also stated, "Every procedure which
would offer a possible temptation to the average man as judge
to forget the burden of proof required to convict the defendant,
or which might lead him not to hold the balance, nice, clear and
true between the State and the accused, denies the latter due
process of law."
While the Supreme Court recognized Ohio's authority to
create courts and to establish their jurisdiction, it held that such
recognition did not at all affect the question of whether the state
had by law vested judicial power in one, who by reason of his
interest both as an individual and as chief administrative officer
of the village, was disqualified to exercise it. Tumey, the Court
said, still had the right to an impartial judge. He had seasonably raised an objection and was entitled to stop the trial because
of the disqualification of the judge and because of his official
motive to convict.
Interpretationof the Tumey Case by Courts Outside Kentucky
Since the Tumey decision, attempts have been made in several
states to invalidate convictions in justice courts where it appeared
that justices were financially interested in returning convictions.
The majority of such efforts have proved unsuccessful, however,
because most state supreme courts hold that circumstances present in such cases are unlike those of the Tumey case. Some courts
hold that the right to demand a jury trial and the right of appeal
with a trial de novo removes a case from the Tumey class.4 According to such courts, if a fair trial is obtainable anywhere
within a state judicial system due process of law can not be said
to be denied. In some of these cases there also existed the procedural point that exhaustion of all state remedies is prerequisite
to appeal to federal courts. 5
Other courts hold that, even though a justice be disqualified
4 Ex parte Steele 220 N.C. 685, 18 S.E. 2d 132 (1942); Ex parte Lewis, 47
OCR 72, 288 P. .354 (1930); Ex parte Meeks, 20 F. 2d 543 (1927); Hill v. State,
174 Ark. 886, 298 S.W. 321 (1927); Tari v. State, 117 Ohio St. 481, 159 N.E. 594
(1927); Brooks v. Potomac, 149 Va. 427, 141 S.E. 249 (1928).
r See particularly Ex parte Meeks, 20 F. 2d 543 (1927).
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because of financial interest, in the absence of some constitutional
or statutory requirement that courts be presided over by disinterested judges, a judgment rendered by him is not void, but
voidable only, and has the effect of legality until declared illegal
in a proper proceeding." Such judgment cannot be attached collaterally nor challenged on a writ of habeas corpus. 7 Still other

courts, starting from the position that constitutional rights may
be waived provided their waiver is not contrary to public policy,
hold that, in the absence of some constitutional or statutory provision, failure of a defendant to make seasonable objection to trial
before a disqualified judge, when he has or is presumed to have
full knowledge of the disqualification, constitutes a waiver of his
right to trial by a disinterested judge and estops him from raising
the disqualification question on appeal." It should be pointed
out that, in its opinion in the Tumey case, the United States Supreme Court twice noted that Tumey had raised the disqualification question prior to his trial. But a categorical answer cannot
be given to its influence on the decision reached by the Court.
Nevertheless, several state supreme courts interpreting and applying the Tumey decision lay considerable stress upon it.
Although in most instances, state supreme courts have upheld
the constitutionality of their own justice of the peace systems by
distinguishing them from that prevailing in Ohio at the time of
the Tumey decision, in some instances federal and state courts

have used the decision in the Tumey case to void or outlaw convictions in justice courts. In 1927, one federal district court in the
case of Ex parte Baer9 released on a writ of habeas corpus a defendant who had been convicted and given a fine and jail sentence
in a Kentucky county judge's court for liquor-law violations.
Here, the court held that the defendant had been denied due
process of law due to the judge's financial interest in the result
of the trial. He had previously appealed to a state court for the
writ, but it had been denied. He did not, prior to his trial, raise
6Tari v. State, 117-Ohio St., 481, 159 N.E. 594 (1927); City of Grafton v.
Holt, 58 W. Va. 182. 52 S.E. 21 (1905); White v. Lane, 158 N.C. 14, 68 S.E.
895 (1910); Ex parte Steele, 220 N.C. 685, 18 S.E. 2d 132 (1942).
7 Ex parte Steele, 220 N.C. 685, 18 S.E. 2d 132 (1942).
8 Bryant v. State, 146 Miss. 533, 112 So. 675 (1927); State v. Simmons, 117
W. Va. 326, 185 S.E. 417 (1936); Tart v. State, 117 Ohio St. 581.159 N.E. 594
(1927); Ex parte Steele, 220 N.C. 685, 18 S.E. 2d 132 (1942); Ex parte Meeks,
20 F. 2d 543 (1927); Adams v. Slavin, 225 Ky. 135, 7 S.W. 2d 836 (1928).
9 20 F. 2d 912 (1927).
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objection to the judge's disqualification, nor did he, before seeking the federal writ, exhaust his state remedies by appealing to
the state's highest court.'" The court stated, however, that he
could not be expected to know the justice's disqualification and,
consequently, held that he had not waived it. Shortly after the
Baer case, another federal district court in the case of Ex parte
Meeks" refused to issue a writ of habeas corpus to release from
state jurisdiction a defendant convicted under circumstances

similar to those in the Baer case, on the ground that, even if the
principles announced in the Tumey case were applicable, the defendant had not objected to the judges disqualification at the
time of trial, nor did he appeal to the circuit court where a trial
de novo before a disinterested judge was available. These two
decisions are at direct variance with each other, with the latter
decision being the most commonly accepted interpretation of the
Tumey case.
A significant state decision interpreting Tumey v. Ohio is Williams v. Brannen,'2 decided by the West Virginia Supreme Court
of Appeals. Here, the Court awarded a writ of prohibition to a
defendant to prevent his trial before a justice who, according to
his allegations, would have a pecuniary interest in convicting him.
The justice drew his compensation from costs paid by defendants
when convicted and from a fund accumulated by fines assessed in
his court. He was compensated by the latter method in cases
where he rendered a verdict of acquittal and in cases where costs
for any proper reason could not be collected from those adjudged
guilty. The implication of such a compensation system was that
the justice was required to convict in an appreciable number of
cases in order to create a fund to secure payment of fees in cases

in which he collected no costs. The Court refused to make fine
distinctions between the facts in this case and those in the Tumey
case, holding them inconsequential in view of the Supreme Court's
pronouncement in the Tumey case that, "Every procedure which
would offer a possible temptation to the average man as a judge
to forget the burden of proof required to convict the defendant,
10 For these two reasons the court's issuance of the writ has been criticized
as being unsound in principle. See note in 14 Va. Law Rev. 483-484 (April 1928).
See also Tari v. State, 117 Ohio St. 481, 159 N.E. 594 (1927).
1120 F. 2d 543 (1927).
12 116 W. Va. 1, 178 S.E. 67 (1935).
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or which might lead him not to hold the balance nice, clear and
true between the state and the accused denies the latter due
process of law." It held that due process of law required that a
justice's compensation must not depend upon a fund created by
his own convictions and, consequently, declared unconstitutional
the West Virginia statutory system of compensating justices. It
rejected arguments that right to demand trial by jury and right
of appeal with trial de novo made conditions in this case different
from those in the Tumey case. Trial by jury, it said, meant trial
before a jury under the direction of a disinterested judge, and
right of appeal did not meet the situation because a defendant
would ordinarily incur less costs by paying a moderate fine than
by paying appeal costs. Further, the Court held that an accused
was entitled to a fair and impartial trial in the first instance.
The decision of the West Virginia Court in the Williams case
declaring unconstitutional the West Virginia statutory system of
compensating justices was further explained-and, it seems, its
impact lessened-in the court's later holding in State v. Simmons. 3
The pertinent question in the Williams case, it said, concerned
the qualification of the justice, not the jurisdiction of his court
which, according to it, remained unimpaired. Accordingly, it held
that, when a defendant did not raise in the trial court the question
concerning the justice's disqualification, it was deemed waived
and could not be raised for the first time on appeal. A judgment
rendered under such circumstances, it said, was voidable only,
not void. Thus it appears that, if the holding in the Williams case
is considered in the light of the holding in the Simmons case, the
former case is not at all unique but merely states in somewhat
different language what other courts have said, namely, that a
justice is disqualified to act when his method of compensation
gives him a direct interest in influencing the result of a trial. But
disqualified justices actually conduct cases, and the important
unresolved question concerns the legality of this practice.
Another case meriting consideration in connection with the
Tumey decision is Ex parte Kelly,14 decided by the Texas Court

of Criminal Appeals. Here, the court reversed a conviction
rendered in a justice court on the grounds that it violated both
13 117 W. Va. 326, 185 S.E. 417 (1936).

14111 Texas Crim. 54, 10 S.W. 2d 728 (1928).
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the United States and Texas Constitutions. Under Texas law,
justices were compensated only in those cases in which they
found defendants guilty. Right of appeal, moreover, was limited
to cases wherein the fine imposed exceeded $100. Although the
Tumey decision had considerable bearing in the Kelly case, perhaps the most significant factor influencing the Court's decision
was the fact that the Texas Constitution (Art. V. sec. 11) forbids
a judge to sit in any case wherein he has an interest. For this
reason, the Court held the justice disqualified, and noted that, as
a general rule, acts of a judge subject to a constitutional disqualification are void. In a subsequent decision, 15 the Texas Court
stated that, in the Kelly case, it did not outlaw the jurisdiction of
justice courts; it merely held that its legislature, by providing that
fees should be payable to justices only in cases wherein they
convicted defendants, had disqualified justices who attempted to
assess and collect such fees. It stated specifically that ".

.

. if the

duly qualified justice should see fit to exercise his prerogative to
try such cases without compensation, it would seem plain that
there would be thus no disqualification..."
In summary, most courts interpret the Tumey principles primarily to disqualify judges from conducting cases wherein they
have a pecuniary interest; but the jurisdiction of courts presided
over by such judges is left unaffected; and, except in instances
where constitutional or statutory provisions require disinterested
judges, they recognize that such judges, when waiver to their disqualification exists, may render legal judgments. Further, some
courts hold that due process of law is not denied in cases conducted by judges having an interest in the outcome provided appeals may be taken from judgments rendered in them.
Kentucky Justice Courts
Before considering the various interpretations of the Tumey
decision made by the Kentucky Court of Appeals, it is necessary
to discuss the Kentucky justice and the functioning of his court.
The Kentucky justice has existed as a constitutional officer since
the beginning of the Commonwealth. The present Constitution
authorizes the voters of each county to elect on a district basis
1

5Ex parte West, 111 Texas Crim. 129, 12 S.W. 2d 216 (1928).
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from three to eight of these officials. 16 In addition to being a
judicial officer, the justice in all save 13 counties, serves as a member of the fiscal court, the chief governing body of the county.
He receives a per diem for serving on the fiscal court and fees for
his judicial duties."1
Kentucky has 678 justices of the peace, but the vast majority
are inactive as judicial officers."' They function primarily in urban
counties where the county judge's time is too occupied with
county administrative problems to permit him to bear cases, in
a considerable number of county-seat towns, and by custom in
certain rural counties, situated particularly in the mountain area
of the state. During the 1954-55 fiscal year, 40,651 convictions
in misdemeanor cases were returned by 161 justices situated
throughout the state. Some justices were much more active than
others. Justice courts functioning in 18 of Kentucky's 120 counties
returned 28,101 convictions or 57 per cent of the total number.
Disregarding county boundaries, it was found that 63 justices
situated in 34 counties returned 26,026 convictions or 64 per cent
of the total. On the other hand, 47 justices each returned ten or
less convictions, with 12 of this number returning only one conviction each.
No legal training is required for holding the office of justice;
anyone meeting the usual age and residence requirements may
fill it; and in actual practice, justices usually possess but little
formal education. Their courts are frequently criticized for their
failure to maintain the dignity and decorum so essential to the
judicial process.
Kentucky justice courts are courts of record and possess jurisdiction coextensive with the county. 9 They are empowered by
statute to conduct preliminary examinations in all felony cases
except murder cases and to hear minor civil and criminal cases,
their civil jurisdiction extending to all cases in which the value in
controversy does not exceed $200 and their criminal jurisdiction
extending to cases in which the punishment is limited to a fine of
See. 142.
Baldwin's Kentucky Revised Statutes Annotated, 1955 (Hereafter referred
to as Baldwins KRS, 1955), sees. 64.220, 64.240, 64.530.
1T
author is indebted to Mr. James T. Fleming of the Kentucky Legislative Research Commission for the original compilation of statistics on the 1954-55
fiscal-year activities of Kentucky justices of the peace.
19 Baldwin's KRS, 1955, sec. 25.660; Constitution of Kentucky, sec. 142.
16

17
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$500 or imprisonment for one year, or both.2 ° (Civil cases are
conducted primarily by justices in a few urban counties and will
not be discussed in this article). Justice courts, along with county
and quarterly courts, the latter courts conducted by county
judges, have exclusive jurisdiction to hear misdemeanor cases
wherein the punishment imposed does not exceed a fine of $20.21
When a jail sentence or a fine of $20 or above is imposed, appeal
may be taken to the circuit court..2 2 In actual practice, however,
justice courts possess final jurisdiction in most cases they conduct.
This seems evidenced by the fact that during the fiscal year 19541955, only seven of the 63 justices returning 100 or more convictions each imposed fines averaging more than $20. Most persons
appearing before justice courts are without counsel, and most
cases are conducted without juries. But defendants may demand
jury trials in all cases in which the punishment imposed by statute
is a jail sentence or a fine above $16.23
The Tumey Decision and the Kentucky Court of Appeals
Priorto the Roberts Decision
In the same year that the United States Supreme Court decided the Tumey case, the constitutionality of the Kentucky
justice of the peace system was challenged before the Kentucky
Court of Appeals when the latter court had presented to it in
the case of Wagers v. Sizemore2 4 the question of whether a trial
before a Kentucky justice, who was financially interested in the
result of the trial, denied a defendant due process of law. In the
case, the defendant had been tried and convicted on a charge of
obstructing a public highway after his protest that, due to the
justice's financial interest in convicting him, he could not receive
a fair and impartial trial. The justice's total fees in this instance
were $6. Since the fine imposed was only $10, the court's judgment was non-appealable. The defendant was tried before a jury,
but the justice argued the case to the jury and directed it to impose a fine. The Court of Appeals, after noting these facts, reversed the conviction, holding itself bound by the decision in the
2

0 Russell's Kentucky Practice, Criminal Code, 1953, sec. 49; Baldwin's KRS,

1955, secs. 25.010, 25.610.
21 Baldwin's KRS, 1955, see. 25.010.
22

Russells Kentucky Practice, Criminal Code, 1953, sec. 362.

23 Ibid.

see. 331.
24 222 Ky. 306, 300 S.W. 918 (1927).
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Tumey case. It noted that, prior to trial, the defendant had raised
objection to the justice's disqualification and held that since he
had done so, the same objection could be made before the Court
of Appeals.
In order to remedy the situation created by the Tumey and
Wagers cases, the Kentucky General Assembly enacted legislation placing the compensation of the county judge, who, like
justices, had until this time been compensated in misdemeanor
cases by fees, on a salary basis. 25 Legislation was also passed
placing the compensation of justices in Jefferson County, containing the City of Louisville, on a salary basis. 26 In a suit brought
under the Declaratory Judgment Act of 1922 to test the constitutionality of legislation altering the method of compensating the
county judge, the Court of Appeals also had presented to it in the
case of Adams v. Slavin,2 7 the question of whether justices of the
peace, in the absence of seasonable objection to their disqualification, had the right to preside at misdemeanor trials. In its opinion,
the Court reviewed its decision in the Wagers case, stating that
even if the cost statute involved in that case was invalid, the
justice had an undoubted right to conduct the trial because he
was not then a disqualified judge, being entitled to no costs or a
part of the fine in the event of conviction. 8 (This same conclusion
it should be recalled, was reached by the Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals). In such an instance, it said, the judgment would not
be void. The court next noted that the Supreme Court in the
Tumey case expressly recognized the right of a state legislature
to vest jurisdiction in state courts. Finally, it concluded that, "the
sole ground on which both the Tumey and Wagers cases rest is
that a defendant has the right to object to being tried by a judge
who is financially interested in his being convicted, and that to
try him after such objection is to deprive him of the protection
of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." It then
raised the question of whether a defendant was also deprived if
he did not object to trial. It answered that constitutional rights,
at least in misdemeanor cases, may be waived and stated, "We
25
2

Kentucky Acts of 1928. Ch. 22.
6 Kentucky Acts of 1982. Ch. 142.

27225 Ky. 135,7 S.W. 2d 836 (1928).
28 This assumes, of course, that an officer can legally neglect to assess and
collect a legislative prescribed fee. For further comment on this question see
below, "The Roberts Decision."
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are of the opinion that where a defendant on a final trial for a
misdemeanor fails to seasonably [sic] object to being tried by a
justice of the peace, the latter may try him, and in the event of
conviction tax the costs against him, as has been the custom for
so many years in this Commonwealth."
The latter statement, until 1956 when the Court of Appeals,
in the Roberts case held justice courts, save those in Jefferson
County, to be without jurisdiction to conduct misdemeanor cases,
summed up Kentucky law with respect to misdemeanor trials in
justice courts. Justices of the peace were really 'standing disqualified judges; and, as stated by the Kentucky Court of Appeals,
they could not collect any fee whatever from a defendant in a
misdemeanor case except through "agreement, acquiescence and
grace." 9 If an accused protested trial before a justice, the latter
was required to transfer his case to an impartial court having
jurisdiction to hear it. 0 In the event a justice refused to transfer
a case after due protest had been made, the proper remedy was
an application to the Court of Appeals for a writ of prohibition
to prevent trial.31 Unfortunately, the vast majority of individuals
brought before justice courts had no legal counsel and were themselves too little aware of their legal rights to be able to assert
them; and, consequently, such rights were in practice generally
rendered meaningless.
The Roberts Decision
By its decision in the Roberts case,32 the Court of Appeals
appears to have brought to an end the justice of the peace system
as it has functioned in the past. This case originated out of an
arrest for a public drunkeness charge. After the arrest, the defendant posted bond for appearance at his trial, but at the time
when it was scheduled, he did not appear, being represented,
however, by an attorney who objected to the jurisdiction of the
court on the ground of the pecuniary interest which the justice
had in the result of the trial. (Ordinarily, it seems that objection
should have been made, not to the jurisdiction of the court, but
to the judge's disqualification.) The justice overruled the objec29 Shbaw v. Fox, 246 Ky. 342, 55 S.W. 2d 11 (1932).

30 Martin v. Wyatt, 225 Ky. 212, 7 S.W. 2d 1048 (1928).
31 See Pinkleton v. Lueke, Williams v. Same, 265 Ky. 84, 95 S.W. 2d 1103

(1936).
32 296

S.W. 2d 745 (Ky. 1956).
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tion for the reason that it was not supported by affidavit of the
defendant, and stated that he would waive his costs and fees.
He then entered an order forfeiting the appearance bond, empanelled a jury, and tried the defendant in absentia. The jury
found the defendant guilty and fixed his fine at $20. The defendant thereupon appealed to the circuit court for an injunction
to restrain enforcement of the judgment; and the injunction being
granted, the justice appealed to the Court of Appeals.
The Court, it seems, could very well have decided the case
upon grounds other than those on which it actually did. It could
have merely sustained the injunction granted by the circuit court;
or, on the other hand, it could have held that, inasmuch as the
justice in the trial court had waived his costs and fees, no pecuniary interest existed and he therefore was within his legal rights
in trying the case. And, indeed, ff costs and fees may legally be
waived, the latter argument seems logical. Not to be overlooked,
moreover, is the fact that the judgment, being a fine of $20, was
appealable to the circuit court where a trial de novo was available.
The Court, however, rejected this argument, stating that an accused is entitled to a fair trial in the first instance. Instead, therefore, of deciding the case by following any of the alternatives
noted, the Court stated, "We feel that the time has come to reconsider our interpretation and application of the decision in the
Tumey case, as set forth in Adams v. Slavin.. ." It said that, in
the Adams case, it had construed the Tumey opinion, not as
declaring the system unconstitutional or as depriving absolutely
of jurisdiction a judge who has a pecuniary interest in the outcome
of a case he conducts, but only as recognizing the constitutional
right of a defendant to object to trial before a disqualified judge.
It added, however, that upon a re-examination of the opinion in
the Tumey case, it was led to conclude that the Supreme Court
"intended to, and did, declare the entire system unconstitutional."
It stated that "no justification exists for perpetrating a system that
is designed and calculated to deprive persons of due process of
law." It could see no merit, moreover, in its previous holding in
the case of Adams v. Slavin that an accused may waive his constitutional right to a trial conducted by an impartial judge. Here,
it declared, "To say, as we did in the Slavin case, that the right to
trial by a judge free from prejudice may be waived is unrealistic
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for as pointed out in Ex parte Baer, 20 Fed. 2d 912, the ordinary
person is not aware of his right to object to the jurisdiction; he
assumes that the court before which he has been is a lawfully
constituted one." (From the language of this statement, it seems
that the Court confuses waiver of jurisdiction with waiver of a
judge's disqualification. The former can not be waived, but the
latter, at least in some instances, can be. It should be added,
moreover, that there is authority for the view that justice courts,
such as Kentucky's, are lawfully constituted. 3
The Court recognized that argument might be made for the
position that the only unconstitutional feature of the justice of
the peace system was the cost statute, and that the jurisdiction of
justice courts to try cases without compensation remained. It
stated, however, that although this view had been accepted as
sound by former Kentucky Courts, the Court as it was now constituted, believing that the legislature did not intend justices to
serve without compensation, disagreed. It admitted that the legislature had authority to require justices to try misdemeanor cases
without compensation; however, it held that the present cost
statute and the statute conferring jurisdiction upon justice courts
must be read together, stating that a system under which justices
served without compensation could occasion such evils as feesplitting and would not lead to a fair administration of justice.
There is further support for the Court's position if the view is
taken that county officers, including justices of the peace, can not
legally waive legislative prescribed fees for performing official
duties. This view is based on the fact that, all revenues, including
fees, accruing to a particular office in excess of those actually required to operate it, belong to the county. The Court ended its
opinion by expressly overruling its former ruling in the Alams
case and by holding that, until some other method of compensation is provided, justices of the peace, save those in Jefferson
county, are without jurisdiction to conduct criminal cases. A
mandate making this ruling effective, however, will not be issued
during the terms of incumbent justices, and such officials may
continue to try cases provided they inform defendants of their
right to demand trial before an impartial court.
33

See particularly Tari v. State, 117 Ohio St. 481, 159 N.E. 594 (1927).
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The Tumey and Roberts Decisions Reconsidered
In its decision in the Roberts case, the Kentucky Court of Appeals perhaps has accorded the Tumey decision greater significance than it has heretofore received from any state supreme
court. One may agree with the end accomplished by the Kentucky Court in the Roberts case-most justice courts are bad and
ought to be abolished or radically altered-without concurring
entirely with some of the reasoning advanced in its opinion. The
Robert's decision rests, of course, on the Kentucky Court's interpretation of the United States Supreme Court's opinion in the
Tumey case. Although the exact meaning of that opinion may not
be clear, it holds at least (1) that the Fourteenth Amendment applies to misdemeanor trials conducted in state courts and (2)
that a judge is disqualified to try a case wherein he has a direct
pecuniary interest. State supreme courts disagree, however, concerning the extent of the Supreme Court's holding in the case,
the Kentucky Court of Appeals holding that it outlaws entirely a
judicial system wherein judges are compensated solely by fees
collected from individuals they convict; however, most other state
courts urge, that it stops short of this, holding that, the jurisdiction
of a court may remain even though its judge is disqualified . 4 The
latter view is probably the correct one, since what the Tumey
case seems to condemn is a certain type of judicial procedure.
It recognizes the right of a state to create courts and to establish
their jurisdiction, but holds that exercise of such jurisdiction
under certain circumstances constitutes a bar to a valid conviction since it denies due process of law. In other words, jurisdiction must be distinguished from exercise of jurisdiction.
Of vital concern in connection with the Tumey decision is
the matter of whether a defendant must raise the question of
judicial disqualification in the trial court. The United States
Supreme Court both at the beginning and end of its opinion in
the Tumey case noted that the defendant in that case had done
so. Although it is impossible to determine what significance the
Supreme Court intended to place upon failure to object to disqualification, several state courts accord it great weight, holding
3

4 Despite the ruling of the Court of Appeals in the Roberts case, Kentucky

justice courts must continue to possess some criminal jurisdiction, inasmuch as the
Constitution (sec. 143) makes the criminal jurisdiction of police (municipal)
courts to depend entirely on that vested in justice courts.
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that, unless seasonable objection is made in the trial court, disqualification is deemed waived. But even if these courts are interpretating the Supreme Court's opinion correctly, another question still arises. Assume for sake of argument that the objection
to disqualification must be made; the average defendant in a
justice court can scarcely be expected to make it. Indeed, prior
to the Tumey case, making the objection did not occur even to
lawyers. In Kentucky, proceedings in a justice court ordinarily
consist in a defendant appearing without counsel before a disqualified justice, who has, as a practical matter, final jurisdiction
in his case. It seems difficult to expect due process of law to
obtain under such circumstances. Herein, however, may lie the
key whereby a criterion may be found to distinguish between a
valid and an invalid trial. No claim of denial of due process of
law ought to be allowed, it seems, concerning any proceeding
in a justice court where a defendant is represented by counsel,
for in such situation constitutional rights can be effectively asserted. Moreover, the same principle ought to hold where a defendant who has no counsel is informed of his constitutional rights
by the trial judge and while competent to act refuses counsel. In
this connection it seems appropriate to note that the recent Court
of Appeals order requiring incumbent justices to inform defendants of their right to demand trial before an impartial court may
have the effect of making such trials as are actually conducted
conform to due process of law. This is based on the asstunption
that justices will strictly observe the court order and that defendants will voluntarily and intelligently consent to trial.
Although the rule that constitutional rights are considered
waived unless claimed at the earliest opportunity-usually in the
trial court-is sound, it seems a questionable one when applied to
misdemeanor cases in which a defendant is unrepresented by
counsel or is not informed of his constitutional rights by the court.
Such rights should not be presumed waived through acquiescence
due to ignorance. The Kentucky Court of Appeals appears therefore to have decided correctly in the Roberts case when it held
that a person unaware of his right to an impartial judge can not
waive that right. According to the United States Supreme Court,
"A waiver is ordinarily an intentional relinquishment or abandon-
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ment of a known right or privilege." 35 Accordingly, unless a defendant in a justice court is represented by counsel, or unless he
is informed of his right to object and is himself competent to act,
waiver of that right does not obtain, inasmuch as unknown rights
can not be relinquished. Further, the Supreme Court has held
that there is ". . . every reasonable presumption against waiver of
fundamental constitutional rights."3 Such rights may be waived,
but their waiver must be competent, voluntary, and intentional37
In instances where a defendant has no counsel, it seems that the
duty of determining whether a competent waiver has taken place
falls upon the court; and, where the court fails to so determine,
it seems that serious doubt arises concerning its jurisdiction to
proceed.
Right to Counsel in Misdemeanor Cases
A trial may be said to conform to the requirements of due
process of law when an accused is afforded full opportunity to
assert effectively his constitutional rights. Opportunity for assertion of such rights must be considered present when an accused
is represented by counsel, or if, when not represented by counsel,
he is informed of them by the court and is himself competent to
act. The average defendant in a justice court, having no counsel
and being himself generally unaware of his constitutional rights,
is certainly in no position to assert them. It is therefore proper
to inquire concerning a defendant's right to counsel in state misdemeanor cases.
In the past, the assumption seems to have been-and still prevails in many states-that a defendant in a non-capital criminal
case, which, of course, includes a misdemeanor case, is not as a
matter of right, entitled to be furnished counsel. Except in very
serious cases-sometimes only in capital cases-state constitutional
provision to the effect that a defendant has a right to be heard
by himself and counsel have not been understood to impose upon
the trial court the duty of furnishing counsel to an accused, or
even of advising him of his need therefor; rather, such provisions
have been taken to mean that a defendant has a right, if he
35

Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 58 Sup. Ct. 1019 (1938).
Ibid.
7Bute v. People of Illinois, 333 U.S. 640, 68 S. Ct. 763 (1948); Foster v.
Illinois, 332 U.S. 134, 67 S. Ct. 1716 (1947).
36
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chooses, to procure assistance of counsel."' Prior to 1938, the Sixth
Amendment was understood to have practically the same meaning in its application to cases in federal courts; but, as a conse39
quence of the Supreme Court's decision in Johnson v. Zerbst,
decided that year, the Amendment has been understood to impose a positive duty upon federal courts to furnish defendants
in such courts with counsel.4 0 But the Supreme Court has never
held that the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
imposes the same duty on state courts, holding instead that lack
of counsel in state non-capital cases denies federal constitutional
protection only when its absence results in a denial of the essentials of justice. 4' In other words, if absence of a lawyer results
in a defendant's not having a fair and adequate defense, or if it
results in his actually being taken advantage of, or prejudiced,
due process of law does seem denied.2
In Kentucky, as in most states, the assumption seems to be
that justice courts-and all lower courts as well-are not required
to furnish counsel to an accused. 3 Formerly, the Kentucky Court
of Appeals took the position that counsel for an accused was
absolutely necessary only in capital cases; 44 but recently it has
reversed itself and now holds that counsel is required in all felony
cases.Y The Court's changed position was probably influenced
by United States Supreme Court decisions concerning an accused's right to counsel in both state and federal courts. In its
38
Betts v. Brady 316 U.S. 455, 62 S. Ct. 1252 (1942); Bute v. People of
Illinois, supra; Holland v. Com., 241 Ky. 813, 45 S.W. 2d 476 (1932); Hamlin v.
Com., 287 Ky. 22, 152 S.W. 2d 297 (1941); People v. Williams, 225 Mich.,
133.195 N.W. 818 (1923).

80304 U.S. 458.58 S. Ct. 1019 (1938).
40 See particularly Betts v. Brady, supra.

41 Betts v. Brady, supra. Gallegos v. Nebraska, 342 U.S. 55, 72 S. Ct. 141
(1951); Uveges v. Com. of Pennsylvania 335 U.S. 437, 69 S. Ct. 184 (1948);

Palmer v. Ashe, 342 U.S. 134, 72 S.Ct. 191 (1951) Four Supreme Court judges,
urging the view that the constitutional guaranty of a fair trial can not be fulfilled
unless an accused has counsel to advise and defend him, would extend the ruling
in the Johnson case to state trials as well. See the dissenting opinion of Justice
Douglas
in Bute v. People of Illinois, supra.
4
"Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736, 68 S.Ct. 1252 (1948).
43 It has been held that a court is not obligated to furnish counsel to an
accused in a misdemeanor case. See State v. Stewart, 38 Ohio L. Abs. 543, 50
N.E. 2d 910 (1943); State v. Martin, 223 Minn. 414, 27 N.W. 2d 158 (1947).
44

Hamlin v. Com., 287 Ky. 22, 152 S.W. 2d 297 (1941); Moore v. Com., 298

Ky. 14.181 S.W. 2d 413 (1944); Holland v. Com., 241 Ky. 813, 45 S.W. 2d 476
(1932).
45 Gholson v. Com., 308 Ky. 82, 212 S.W. 2d 537 (1948); Noted 38 Ky. L.J.
317 (1950).
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opinion requiring counsel for defendants in felony cases, the Kentucky quoted with approval the following statement of the Supreme Court:
There are some individuals who, by reason of age, ignorance, or mental capacity, are incapable of representing
themselves adequately in a prosecution of a relatively simple
nature. Their incapacity is purely personal and can be determined only by an examination and observation of the individual. Where such incapacity is present, the refusal to
appoint counsel is a denial
of due process of law under the
Fourteenth Amendment. 46
The Kentucky Court further held that common justice demands
that every person accused of a felony be given a fair and impartial
trial.
Although the stakes involved in misdemeanor cases are certainly less than those involved in felony cases, it seems that the
requirements of due process of law demand that the same principles of justice be observed in them. Although as a matter of
actual fact they do, constitutional standards of fairness ought not
to depend on what court an accused is in.4 In the past all too
little regard has been had for observance of procedures essential
to due process in state misdemeanor cases simply because such
cases concern petty matters and because but little formal protest
has been made to the manner in which such cases have been conducted. Although trial of an accused without counsel in a misdemeanor case is not, in itself, unconstitutional, it may, when
taken with other factors, result in a denial of due process of law. 48
Due process of law requires that an accused in a misdemeanor
case be given at least a fair trial. One of the elements of such a
trial is right to counsel. Importance of counsel would seem to
loom great in a trial conducted by a disqualified judge. Absence of
counsel under such circumstances would seem to deny due process
of law, because it would result in an accused being taken advantage of, for, surely the first duty of counsel, if present, would
be to object to the disqualification and to demand trial before
an impartial judge. One reason given by the Supreme Court for
its refusal to read its interpretation of the Sixth Amendment into
46Wade v. Mayo, 334 U.S. 672, 68 S. Ct. 1270 (1948).
47 Cf. Justice Douglas' dissent in Bute v. People of Illinois, supra.
48 See Ex parte Carter, 14 N.J. Super. 591, 82 A. 2d 652 (1951).
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the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is the fact
that, should it do so, argument would be made that counsel should
be assigned defendants in justice and all other minor courts. 49
The Court takes the position that it is unreasonable to assume
that a fair trial can not be had in a state court unless a defendant
has counsel. But when it does so, it evidently presumes a trial
conducted before an unprejudiced judge.50
Finally, it seems that the United States Supreme Court in the
Tumey case holds that any judge having a pecuniary interest in a
case is disqualified from conducting it. It seems, however, that,
although the disqualification does not, in itself, affect the jurisdiction vested in his court by the legislature, such jurisdiction if
exercised when there has been no waiver to the disqualification,
can be lost. This would seem to result when a court proceeds to
conduct a case wherein an accused has not intelligently waived
his right to counsel. If jurisdiction is assumed lost under such circumstances, right of appeal, as urged by some courts, is not the
proper solution to the problem presented by convictions rendered
by disqualified justices.5
The decision of the Kentucky Court of Appeals in the Roberts
case seems correct to the extent that it holds that right to trial
before an unprejudiced judge may not be waived. It seems correct also in holding that the Kentucky legislature intends justices
of the peace to collect fees in all misdemeanor cases they conduct. But there is considerable doubt concerning its holding that
all Kentucky justices, save those in Jefferson County, are without
jurisdiction to conduct misdemeanor cases. Such judicial officers,
it seems, have jurisdiction to conduct cases when actual waiver
to their disqualification exists.
49
5

Betts v. Brady, supra.

0 Mr. Justice Black, speaking recently for a majority of the Supreme Court,

stated, "A fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due process." See
In Re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 75 S. Ct. 623 (1955).
51 The question of jurisdiction, however, can always be raised on appeal.
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